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Abstract. This paper discusses a network-analysis approach to the performance control of integrated built-environment 
systems based on efficiency, effectiveness, and adequacy. We apply this perspective to the governance of systems of local 
transport companies in built environments, which are frequently organized as networks. To this end, we propose a multi-
dimensional grid of first- and second-order ties to locate network units and individuate the adequacy or appropriateness 
of network structures for performance control. In this field, issues connected to transport systems such as sustainability 
play a crucial role in defining structures and processes of network performance control. We empirically examine a pilot 
case of local public transport companies in the Forlì-Cesena area (Italy), testing network adequacy and giving evidence for 
the optimal localization of governance among units dedicated to providing transport services. Our results also support the 
hypothesis that, although structural centralization was ostensibly oriented towards increasing governance, the structure 
actually devolved into decentralized control at the periphery of the network, diminishing the effectiveness of initiatives.
Keywords: built environment, transport, network, ties, governance.
Introduction
The built environment is characterized by networks of or-
ganizations with different degrees of centralization, often 
resulting from mergers or restructurings undertaken to 
increase efficiency. The impact of these networks on the 
built environment is connected to a growing complexity 
that shifts the focus from individuals’ actions to those of 
groups, organizations, and nations – all pursuing a variety 
of interests that are often in conflict (Williams, 2013).
In the built environment, governance networks can 
facilitate coordinated action and shared opportunities in 
many different systems: community, transport, biological, 
religious, residential, business, and retail. This lends sup-
port to various social and economic activities and pro-
cesses that affect the development of cities both across 
space and time (Brandon & Lombardi, 2005). Further-
more, among these networks, specific ties are developed 
to meet the need to control and improve performance (Al-
exander, Andrachuk, & Armitage, 2016). In this context, 
transport networks can be considered as an integral part 
of a fairer, more sustainable built environment, helping to 
drive the development of cities and the global economy 
on a larger scale (Banister & Hickman, 2006). Therefore, 
greater emphasis on integrating transport systems into the 
built environment is well recognized as a contributor to 
better quality of life and public health (Sarkar, Webster, & 
Gallacher, 2014).
The term “built environment” denotes human-made 
spaces that are affected by multiple factors at the micro, 
meso and macro levels. The corollary of this is a complex 
decision-making process in which multiple assessment 
criteria must be considered simultaneously (Kaklauskas, 
Tupenaite, Zavadskas, Turskis, & Seniut, 2010).
In this paper, we study local public transport (“LPT”) 
networks in the light of the broader concept of the built 
environment, in order to unpack complexity and explore 
these networks’ profound interdependencies with deci-
sions on urban development.
LPT clearly represents a key issue for understanding 
the complexity of the built environment, due to the need 
to integrate transportation and land use (Marti & Wei-
dmann, 2016). Considering LPT issues as part of policies 
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and decisions on the built environment significantly im-
proves planning practices. However, to gauge the benefits 
of effective integration, it is essential to keep track of LPT 
systems’ efficiency and overall performance.
Over the last 20 years, the Italian LPT sector has expe-
rienced deep and wide-ranging regulatory review, since the 
reform introduced by Legislative Decree 422/97 (Decreto 
Legislativo 19 novembre 1997, n. 422 …) (The so-called 
“Burlando,” issued in implementation of Act no.  59/97 
(Legge delega n. 59 del 15 marzo 1997 …), revised and 
supplemented by the Legislative Decree. N. 400/99 (De-
creto Legislativo 20 settembre 1999, n. 400 …) and subse-
quent amendments). The main objective was to overcome 
the emergent limitations of a previous law, 151/81 (Legge 
quadro n. 151 del 10 aprile 1981 …), with four key themes: 
1) decentralizing functions from the state to the regions 
(and from these to local authorities in a logic of subsid-
iarity); 2) recovery of territorial planning; 3) delivering 
sector-wide efficiency gains; and 4) liberalizing the sector 
by contracting out services via tenders and competition 
procedures (ISFORT, 2014).
In accordance with these regulatory priorities, LPT 
was forced to develop a wide variety of network ties based 
on participation, property, mergers, and the transfer of 
business units and service contracts between actors within 
the sector. These ties are based on incoming and outgo-
ing elements of the network (mainly derived from mergers 
and the reallocation of business units). They represent the 
main sources of public-sector control over the transport 
system, as exercised by local authorities (“EELLs”).
To explore these ties, we propose a network analysis 
tool based on the principle of spans of control, and on 
the localization of network units into either the core or 
periphery of the network. In this view, the governance of 
interconnected transport companies in the built environ-
ment relies on the ties that are created among them, and 
which represent the key issues for performance control. 
The location and movement of a company within the net-
work derives from the dynamics of extant relationships, 
which create both opportunities and threats (Thornton, 
Henneberg, & Naudé, 2014).
In the LPT sector, control depends on the govern-
ance of networked organizations. It is mainly concerned 
with efficiency, and to a lesser extent with effectiveness. 
To study it, we consider managerial constraints in terms 
of the span of control, proposing an alternative to Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) to locate network units within 
a multidimensional system. This allows us to determine 
the adequacy or appropriateness of network structures, 
and to propose governance as a central topic, based on 
the assumption that sustainable strategic control is con-
nected to the localization of the leading company in the 
network core.
We measure the span of control, classically defined by 
Graiciunas (1973) as the number of organizational posi-
tions controlled by the uppermost position in the hierar-
chy, by the balance between the first- and second-order 
ties. We apply this analysis to a pilot project involving a 
system of local transport companies managed by ATR, the 
LPT agency of the Forlì-Cesena basin (Italy). Our aim is 
to outline the optimal localization of governance among 
units in the period 2001–2015 by focusing on several 
types of ties between these units–specifically, ties based 
on participation, property, mergers, shifting of business 
units and service contracts.
In LPT, regulations individuate such connections, 
which then produce strengths and weaknesses from both 
a strategic and a managerial perspective. We focus par-
ticularly on organizational networking, distinguishing be-
tween first- and second-order ties within a multidimen-
sional system containing ATR and its network units.
Moreover, the managerial changes resulting from the 
factors we explore raise the question of whether ATR and 
its network of companies may be labeled as a stable sys-
tem, or whether the system exhibits a high degree of or-
ganizational instability. The latter conclusion is suggested 
by the involvement of decision-making processes and eco-
nomic issues in areas such as efficiency, effectiveness, and 
adequacy (Hull, 2011).
Our research question is whether network units move 
towards the core or the periphery of the system in order 
to enhance governance, and how this affects performance 
control.
We begin by reviewing theoretical background on the 
built environment and its connection with the transport 
system, before moving on to our methodological frame-
work. We then present out analysis of the ATR case, to-
gether with a discussion of our results and their implica-
tions for the built environment.
1. THeoretical background
The built environment traditionally comprises the physi-
cal artifacts and elements of human-manufactured living, 
working, traveling, and recreational infrastructures (God-
frey, 2010). From an organizational point of view, this 
concept evokes a complex and multi-layered network of 
ecological, social, cultural, economic, and political inter-
organizational relationships. These relationships operate 
on a variety of levels, increasing the inherent complex-
ity, risk, and unpredictability of urban systems (Finka & 
Kluvankova, 2015).
In modern society, transportation and public transit 
have emerged as critical issues in the built environment 
(Ewing & Cervero, 2010). This is, by nature, a complex 
field, due to the multitude of decisions, actions, and ac-
tors involved at most or all stages of the city-building 
process. Hence, reflecting on issues related to transport 
infrastructure and urban mobility may represent a use-
ful lens to address complexity in the built environment. 
Reasoning in terms of infrastructure reveals how a group 
of interacting, interconnected, and interdependent ele-
ments affect each other within a whole (Doloi, Crawford, 
Langston, & Pheng, 2015). By taking a balanced focus on 
both the whole and its constituent parts, infrastructural 
reasoning helps us understand the world in an integrative 
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manner. This view provides deep insights into how under-
lying relationships drive economic patterns of activity and 
behavior, introducing elements of change and potentially 
leading to a better interpretation of issues related to the 
built environment.
This systematic view, based on jointly interpreting the 
built environment, infrastructure for mobility, and trans-
portation issues, shows how individual elements interact 
in a broader pattern or arrangement to trigger societal 
outcomes (Banister & Berechman, 2000). By recognizing 
the built environment as a complex system, we highlight 
the importance of the interrelationships between core ele-
ments such as transportation, housing, and urban design 
(Preiser, 2015).
In this paper, we suggest that mobility decisions at ur-
ban level are deeply intertwined with the main features 
and structures of the built environment. These intercon-
nections can contribute to key aspects of populations’ 
quality of life, since they facilitate access to a diverse mix 
of infrastructure, services, and resources. Our approach is 
based on the idea that a network-driven view of such re-
lationships enables us to look at the interacting behaviors 
of elements and actors in the urban system.
Public transport serves as an important mode of trans-
portation in many major cities around the world (Giorgi, 
2003). It has many advantages over private transportation: 
It takes up less road space, alleviates traffic congestion, 
provides mobility to urban residents, and may save com-
muting costs and reduce carbon emissions. Also, public 
transportation promotes health, for taking transit usually 
requires at least some walking.
Mobility lies at the core of modern countries’ eco-
nomic development. Decisions on how to manage it de-
termine whether cities and industries will thrive, survive, 
or decline. Investments in infrastructure (roads, railways, 
ports, and so on) bring about significant effects in terms of 
economic and social growth, permanently or temporarily 
involving local businesses and workers in the geographical 
area receiving investment (Banister & Berechman, 2001).
In fact, the development of the economy -and quality 
of life itself- is strongly conditioned by the way in which 
growing mobility needs are satisfied by transport infra-
structures and properly managed transportation systems 
(road, rail, maritime, air, and intermodal). Transport in-
frastructures are invaluable social and economic assets, 
since they influence trade as well as industrial and resi-
dential locations. In this paper, we contend that LPT per-
formance is a key element of the overall adequacy of the 
built environment, implying a powerful case for studying 
this issue.
Transport infrastructures are regulated at macro level, 
but implemented locally. They interact with a physical 
space and must cope with the need of citizens and busi-
nesses. From this follows the complex problem of relations 
between levels of competence and a variety of involved 
interests, bringing about negotiations and political trans-
actions that necessarily take place between groups with 
different vested interests (Van der Vleuten, 2004).
In Italy, LPT is highly fragmented, due to the involve-
ment of a number of different companies that must reor-
ganize themselves in order to compete for tenders, form 
consortia and temporary partnerships, or pursue mergers 
and acquisitions (Incerti, 2014).
Through aggregation processes such as M&A, the LPT 
sector is still seeking the appropriate configuration to re-
duce the problems of excessive fragmentation of supply 
(Della Porta & Gitto, 2013). Such relationships are also 
connected to the 2015 Italian Stability Law (No 190 of 23 
December 2014, Art. 1, par. 609–616), which requires lo-
cal authorities to introduce operational plans for the ra-
tionalization of local subsidiaries in order to reduce their 
number and overall cost. Overall, the need for a more 
interconnected transport system, reflected in official de-
cisions, as well as the new exigencies of the built envi-
ronment in which LPT companies operate, provide the 
impetus for the creation of new organizational networks 
originating from a leader unit (Legge di stabilità n. 190 del 
23 Dicembre 2014 …).
Transport infrastructures draw on significant resourc-
es, and their intrinsically public nature raises important 
policy concerns (Dunn & Perl, 1994). The impacts of deci-
sions on infrastructure can reverberate for decades, even 
centuries. Transport infrastructure planning and imple-
mentation is therefore an important issue at national and, 
increasingly, international level, and is characterized by 
interdependence among public and private actors, with 
conflicting interests and unpredictable outcomes.
The outcomes delivered by a transportation infra-
structure depend on which public and private parties are 
involved, their interactions, and the resulting decisions. 
Sometimes transport infrastructures may be hampered by 
the fact that their related risks are too great and expen-
sive to cover. Conversely, straightforward implementation 
processes can sometimes be explained by the fact that the 
parties involved underestimated the risks involved and 
their coverage. In such circumstances, the final outcome 
can be severe obstacles in the subsequent realization and 
exploitation phases (Mercurio, Canonico, & Pezzillo Ia-
cono, 2012).
Public transport infrastructures usually operate in a 
complex environment with several key players (Martinez, 
2000, 2003). Traditionally, organizational network studies 
on infrastructures make the following distinction in terms 
of actors: users, voters, local authorities acting as public 
representatives, public transport companies or operators 
responsible for daily management, and transport infra-
structure owners. These actors fulfill a range of roles and 
functions in the business of passenger transport, includ-
ing: supplying of a variety of services to clients (users), 
paying for service provision by clients (plus supplemen-
tary payment as public subsidies), and public regulation 
(Giorgi, 2003).
When dealing with highly intertwined public policies, 
the traditional concepts of markets and hierarchies as 
coordination mechanisms need to be revisited: we need 
new schemes capable of reflecting differentiated systems 
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of actors. To this extent, the network research tradition 
points out that the implementation of public infrastruc-
tures comes from a public policy decision-making process 
(Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). “Interdependency” 
is the key word in this approach: the network concept is 
used to indicate patterns of relations between interdepen-
dent actors involved in processes of establishing relations 
within the built environment, which coalesce around pol-
icy issues and/or programs. Attention focuses on the way 
networks influence the development and implementation 
of public policy for the built environment, which means 
analyzing the collective action of actors. Since the network 
concept typically refers to interorganizational policymak-
ing, most studies apply it at a broader level of specific 
policy fields.
2. Methodological framework
In contrast to the rich literature on network management, 
the concept of organizational networking is scarcely de-
veloped (Ford & Mouzas, 2013). Moreover, empirical 
findings have not yet provided consolidated constructs on 
what shapes organizational networking (Thornton, Hen-
neberg, & Naudé, 2013).
Our approach is to investigate a company embedded 
in a business network based on different types of direct 
and indirect relationships that connect it to the wider re-
lational environment. Therefore, the resources available in 
the network affects the firm’s position within it in terms of 
behaviors and decisions (Burt, 2000; Zaheer & Bell, 2005; 
Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994; Pfeffer & Salan-
cik, 1978).
In this context, Ritter (1999) conceptualized network 
competence as the means through which a company de-
velops routines and practices to deal with its surround-
ing multi-company network, by managing and using 
business relationships according to a life cycle structured 
into initiation, development, and termination (Mitrega, 
Forkmann, Ramos, & Henneberg, 2012; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997).
The understanding of how a company can manage its 
direct relationship network is connected to the use of cer-
tain internal organizational practices that deal with the ef-
ficiency of a company’s relationship portfolio. Day (1994) 
distinguished inside-out practices, established as internal 
processes, from outside-in ones, which are related to net-
work sensing and strategizing and so externally oriented. 
Other authors (Holmen & Pedersen, 2003; Zaefarian, 
Henneberg, & Naudé, 2011) underlined strategic intent, 
citing resource mobilization and information gathering as 
the main drivers of organizational networking.
However, the concept of organizational networking ex-
tends beyond managing direct relationships. The structure 
of the network, which is related to a company’s network 
position, generates the patterns of interactions not only 
with directly connected counterparts, but also with indi-
rectly connected ones (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, & Sne-
hota, 2003; Möller & Halinen, 1999).
Direct or first-order ties do not exist in isolation 
(Granovetter, 1985; Ritter, 2000). They are used by a com-
pany not only to capture resources but also to mobilize 
those that are embedded in indirect relationships by dint 
of being mediated by one or more other firms (Mouzas & 
Naudé, 2007; Thornton et al., 2013).
This paper asks how companies can efficiently and ef-
fectively manage such complex networks with regard to 
mobilizing both their direct and their indirect business ties.
On this theme, many software applications-includ-
ing UCINET, NetMiner II, MultiNet, SNA, SNAP, and 
STRUCTURE-are used to analyze social networks. They 
produce graphs of network layouts based on nodes and 
ties, but unfortunately these representations can be hard 
to read, and do not always help an intuitive interpretation.
A crucial question is whether the focus of SNA should 
indeed be on relationships and not on other topics typi-
cally related to organizational analysis- such as power 
concentration and performance expressed in terms of ef-
fectiveness, the efficiency and adequacy of network con-
trol; or, in a general perspective, the strategic profile of 
networks. Furthermore, SNA is not merely a theory or a 
methodology, but a paradigm in the sense that it does not 
anticipate the evolution of the phenomena under analysis 
(Marin & Wellman, 2011).
Many critical issues of network analysis are brought 
into sharper focus if we consider the organizational prin-
ciples of governance unity, spans of control, and shorten-
ing lines of communication that are the main antecedents 
of planning macro and micro structures (Bianchi, 2007).
Authors locate the core of a network in the area where 
there is the highest density of ties, as opposed to the pe-
riphery, where these connections are sparser. Consequent-
ly, social network studies focus almost exclusively on the 
elements that drive tie-building–particularly personal ties, 
based on friendship for instance, that frequently arise be-
yond organizational assets. In these terms, SNA outlines 
factors distinct from the more instrumental forms of work 
collaboration that represent the key conditions for the ef-
fective, efficient, and adequate functioning of organiza-
tions (Bianchi & Tampieri, 2014).
Figure 1. A grid for organizational networking analysis  
Bianchi and Tampieri (2014)
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We propose a multidimensional grid (Figure  1) that 
aims to overcome these criticisms by gathering evidence 
in four dimensions: a) first-order ties between units; b) 
second-order ties between units; c) distance from the net-
work core; and d) the organizational complexity expressed 
by the relationship between first- and second-order ties. 
In this view, complexity mainly derives from the preva-
lence of first-order ties, while the prevalence of second-
order ones simplifies the network from the organizational 
perspective. We used this grid to empirically research 
transport network companies characterized by a complex 
system of interacting elements, in order to determine the 
optimal localization of governance.
In the transport sector, networks such as these are gov-
erned by internal (statutes, codes of conducts and service 
contracts) and external rules (concerning accounting bod-
ies, tax accounting, civil law, and public-sector funding).
Building on this last point of view, we investigate 
whether the basic organizational process can be consid-
ered stable, even though our context involves a network of 
multiple, variously interconnected business units.
According to Gastaldi, Rossi, and Vescovi (2013) stud-
ies that configure the transportation network as a complex 
system of multiple interacting elements, we divide ties into 
five categories:
 – mergers derive from the unification of two or more 
companies to create a new company,
 – participation refers to roles and/or shares held in one 
company by another, in order to exercise power over 
it and control functions,
 – property refers to the connection between local au-
thorities (EELLs) and companies in which EELLs 
represent the owners,
 – shifts of business units derive from the outsourcing 
of business units from one company to one or more 
others,
 – contracts of service are the main instrument that 
regulates the relationship between the agency and 
the company in charge of public transport services 
provision. It defines the quantitative and qualitative 
parameters of performance.
Each of these mechanisms affects both the internal and 
external dimensions of the network; they often represent 
the attempt of public entity (EELLs) to increase or main-
tain the control of transport system.
Does the evolution of LPT networks meet this defini-
tion? This is the question we want to investigate, using the 
tools of network analysis based on managerial principles 
and, particularly, the span of control. It arises from the fact 
that the dynamic stability of a network that evolves over 
time can be governed less by a single central unit than by a 
nucleus in which the core of the network is concentrated, 
and which is determined by a nexus of participations and 
property.
For this purpose, we want to determine and track the 









Figure 2. Elements of system performance and corresponding 
network functions
 – effectiveness is the ratio between results and targets. 
It measures the attainment of targets in terms of the 
punctuality of buses on their routes,
 – efficiency considers the relationship between results 
and resources, and evidences the attempt to maxi-
mize the results achieved with the resources avail-
able. For example, the ratio between the total num-
ber of accidents and the distance travelled per year 
(in km) can be considered as a measure of efficiency,
 – adequacy, as the ratio between resources and targets, 
gauges whether the available resources are congruent 
with the targets set. In our context, transport systems, 
the percentage of vehicles with low-pollutant emis-
sions out of the total of vehicles used is an expression 
of adequacy.
In such terms, effectiveness and efficiency are connect-
ed to operative management functions, as they are based 
on results – while adequacy is the main reference point for 
governance and strategic functions.
Having connected performance control to network 
functions, we now go on to apply it to an empirical study 
of transport network companies in the Forlì-Cesena basin, 
with the main purpose of testing the proposed multidi-
mensional grid.
3. An empirical study of transport network 
companies in the built environment
Following previous research that applied the grid to pro-
ject networks, our study focuses on the transport system 
by examining the network of ties managed by ATR, the 
local public transport (LPT) agency for the Forlì-Cesena 
basin, Italy, over the period 2001–2015.
ATR was founded in 1975 by the Romagna Transport 
Consortium, and assumed the role of Mobility Agency in 
Forlì-Cesena Province in 2001, when it began operating 
in the field of public transport and collective mobility. 
ATR manages three urban networks: Forlì, Cesena, and 
Cesenatico, along with the rural network of the provincial 
basin; its area covers 40 municipalities and pay parking in 
seven municipalities.
ATR is a public economic company owned by the local 
authorities of the Forlì-Cesena basin. It plays a planning 
role that places it center-stage alongside those actors who 
set mobility strategies (local authorities), use the services 
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(clients), and deliver the service (operators). Therefore, it 
is a transport network unit that, as an instrument of local 
authorities, is subject to their directives and turns strategic 
decisions into specific plans for public transport develop-
ment.
ATR plans and controls the public transport service 
and, following a public tender, relies on the outsourc-
ing of service provision to operators. These operators are 
regulated by a service contract that is subject to detailed 
managerial control in areas including service quality, ser-
vice regularity and timeliness, security, claims, and pas-
senger control.
The network, created by ATR in 2001, includes seven 
units (anonymously identified as A–G) that are limited 
companies or limited liability companies operating in the 
transport sector. A is a limited company that was founded 
in 2001 for the management of LPT, 100% owned by ATR. 
B is a limited liability company part-owned by ATR and 
established in 2002. C, a consortium limited company, was 
awarded a tender to run LPT services regulated by a ser-
vice contract with ATR. D resulted from the merger of A 
and B and focuses on Forlì-Cesena basin, while E and F 
serve Rimini and Ravenna respectively.
Moreover, D, E, and F subsequently merged into G, a 
limited public-transport management company that offers 
additional services such as the programming and planning 
of all or part of the production and marketing necessary 
for the provision of people transport; the design, produc-
tion, sale, and marketing of alternative and supplementary 
mobility services; rental of buses (with or without driv-
ers), boats, ferries, and passenger vehicles; and the design, 
construction and operation of works, infrastructure, and 
facilities related to public-sector transportation.
Our analysis focuses on the ties created by ATR with 
C and G through a service contract stipulating network 
performance. These three entities form a common system 
with targets regarding LPT and related services. In this 
system, the owners are the local authorities (EELLs) who 
are part of local society, where they wield their decision-
making power.
In terms of performance management, ATR intervenes 
not only on the ground, in relation to effectiveness and 
efficiency once results have been achieved, but also up-
stream, in terms of adequacy.
In Figure 3 we evidence the main managerial changes 
to the network managed by ATR, through which some 
entities were merged or absorbed in intermediate steps, 
and subsequently disappeared.
The time refers to the year when network units began 
operations. Network ties were formed between them in 
an evolutionary trend, and therefore the complexity of the 
network is related to the coexistence of certain units/com-
panies during the analyzed period, since they focused on 
different specialized activities and services. For example, 
C continued to exist after 2003 because it was part-owned 
by E and F, and connected with the newly established G 
by the service contract beginning in 2015.
Figure 3. The evolution of the ATR network  
(updated to October 2015)
Thus we can outline a complex system of ties, deriving 
mainly from mergers and participation among the compa-
nies created by ATR. These managerial interventions are 
connected firstly to the legislation enacted over time (spe-
cifically the “Burlando” decree of 1997, Emilia-Romagna 
Law No 30 of 2 October 1998 (Legge Regionale Emilia Ro-
magna n. 30 del 02 ottobre 1998 …), and No 10 of 30 June 
2008 (Legge Regionale Emilia Romagna n. 10 del 30 giugno 
2008 …), and secondly to the quest for economies of scale. 
This is particularly clear when we consider the last stages 
of company aggregation in G, as well as the creation of a 
single area for awarding the transportation services, and 
the correspondent unique agency.
Our question is whether the resultant network system 
can be considered a basis for a stable equilibrium, owing 
to the persistence of interconnections among its compo-
nents – despite the apparent simplification of relationships 
that effected a reduction in the number of network units.
To this end, we analyzed the network created by ATR 
by comparing its position to C and G, which were linked 
by having the same typology of service contract, regulating 
financial settlements and the level of service provided in 
the network. We aimed to determine whether the network 
could be considered a stable system, or whether it exhibits 
instead a high degree of organizational instability, since it 
also encompasses decision-making and economic issues 
such as efficiency, effectiveness, and adequacy, creating 
some uncertainties in terms of performance assessment.
The analysis of the significant ties between the com-
panies should allow us to determine whether or not the 
position of the main elements involved, ATR-C-G, belongs 
to a consistent area of governance, affording the network 
an appropriate level of continuity.
Considering the relationships among these units, we 
use a matrix A as: A  = aij individuating first-order (di-
rect) ties among i;j network elements (Table 1) to calculate 
second-order ties as A2 = a2ij among i;j elements (Table 2).
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These data allow us to identify the network core of the 
system, as illustrated in Figure 4  – defined not only by 
the direct links between units, but also indirect ones aris-
ing from the joint participation of components within the 
units that form the network.
The calculation of second-order ties is strongly affected 
by the structural position of first-order ones, since – ac-
cording to previous studies  – different basic network 
shapes (linear, branched, stellar and fully connected) pro-
duce different dynamics of interdependences (Bianchi & 
Tampieri, 2014).
According to the multidimensional grid (Figure  1), 
the study highlights the fact that ATR implemented fewer 
first-order ties (5) than both C (6) and G (6), but more 
second-order ones (25) than either C (24) or G (23). This 
could reflect the fact that ATR is the leader organization 
that created the other companies, engendering greater 
complexity.
As indicated in Figure 4, it seems that the network core 
is quite crowded. Besides ATR–the formal strategic leader 
of the local transport system, along with EELLs (see Fig-
ure 3) – the core also includes C, G, and A: companies 
that are theoretically subject to ATR’s control, since they 
are not regarded as partners with whom ATR would share 
strategic power.
Table 1. The matrix of first-order ties
ATR EELLs A B C D E F G Total
ATR 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5
EELLs 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4
A 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 5
B 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4
C 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 6
D 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4
E 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
F 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
G 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6
Total 5 4 5 4 6 4 2 2 6 38
Table 2. The matrix of second-order ties
ATR EELLs A B C D E F G Total
ATR 5 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 25
EELLs 2 4 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 20
A 3 2 5 3 2 2 1 1 4 23
B 2 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 3 20
C 3 3 2 2 6 3 1 1 3 24
D 4 2 2 1 3 4 1 1 1 19
E 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12
F 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 12
G 2 2 4 3 3 1 1 1 6 23
Total 25 20 23 20 24 19 12 12 23 178
Figure 4. The location of ATR network units  
in the grid of analysis
Moreover, the EELLs’ position is quite far from the 
network core. This confirms the shift of EELLs to the 
periphery, which was due to the network evolution that 
emerged in the local transport system over the last decade, 
driven by national regulations.
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Discussion and conclusions
Despite the formal, ostensibly central position of ATR as 
procurement agent, our findings seem to suggest that its 
substantial position is that of an intermediate body be-
tween the core and periphery of the system (Figure 4).
ATR is closer to the network periphery than C and G, 
owing to the evolutionary process that the system has un-
dergone. The effect is a severe impairment of ATR’s ability 
to control the effectiveness and efficiency of the network, 
with implicit changes in the roles of key units and distor-
tions of system performance (Figure 5).
The analysis confirms the progressive marginalization 
of ATR over the period under scrutiny, in contrast with 
the role originally assigned to it as local agency for mobil-
ity and local public transport, responsible for regulating 
the entirety of the network and its service standards. Such 
a marginalization could mean a weakening of governance, 
and consequently we can hypothesize a path towards an 
unstable state and problems with control.
The process has been accomplished by shifting the fo-
cus of the system towards a network core characterized 
by companies and with local-authority interdependences. 
The ties distance the operative components of the system 
from the area in which the control can be realized by ATR 
in an effective, efficient, and adequate way. The dynamics 
of the network can only distort these conditions, making 
governance and control precarious at best-not only for 
ATR, but also for EELLs.
Our analysis, applied to a pilot case represented by the 
network of ties managed by ATR in recent decades, pro-
vides evidence for the problematic localization of govern-
ance among units under its control. In particular, our find-
ings show that, although ATR implemented a structural 
centralization apparently intended to strengthen govern-
ance, the structure asset, evidenced by the grid of analysis, 
moved towards a decentralized control process located in 
the network periphery, with a concomitant diminished ef-
fectiveness of initiatives.
These findings have important ramifications for the more 
consolidated built-environment perspectives on transporta-
tion issues, which have traditionally underestimated the role 
of decentralized network adaptation properties in favor of 
more top-down, integrated approaches (Handy, 2005).
Furthermore, the multidimensional analysis grid al-
lows us to understand the appropriate way to structure 
networks and maintain effective governance in complex 
systems by considering the span of control as a concept 
leading to a balance between first- and second-order ties.
One limitation of our research that could be addressed 
by future work is the use of a particular range of connec-
tions to individuate network ties–although the selected 
ties, including property, service contracts and others, are 
in any case the tools used to promulgate strategies and 
orientations connected to control. Despite the variety of 
ties, the reason behind network evolution is the same: to 
increase or maintain control over a complex system. But 
the emergent problem is that these networks frequently 
didn’t solve the problem of controlling performance, and 
indeed resulted in less-governed processes.
The potential of an approach based on our proposed 
analysis grid requires wider validation, not only in terms 
of network governance and control, but also by extension 
to the capability of local transport systems, considered as 
the network of engaged organizations, to maintain their 
performance in emergency situations and to absorb the 
unpredictable impact of movement and migrations of 
populations, since this seems to be the latest challenge for 
the transport sector and its constituent organizations.
Another limitation relates to the fact that we only ana-
lyzed data in the period 2001–2015, even though the net-
work and its units existed for some years, and their evo-
lution cannot be extrapolated into the immediate future, 
owing to the international and national regulations that 
significantly affect LPT policies and the strategic orienta-
tion of ATR and companies in its network.
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